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COPYRIGHT AND STATE GOVERNMENT: AN ANALYSIS




The Florida Legislature amended the Public Records Law' in 1990
to allow state and local agencies to copyright data processing software
developed by an agency for its own use. 2 In Florida the authority to
copyright internally-developed materials, including agency-developed
software programs, "must be expressly granted to [an] agency." 3 Be-
fore the enactment of this new copyright provision, only a very small
number of public agencies had such authority. 4 Section 119.083, Flor-
ida Statutes, however, allows any agency "to hold copyrights for data
processing software created by the agency and to enforce its rights
pertaining to such copyrights. '" For the purposes of this section, an
"agency" is broadly defined as "any state, county, district, authority,
or municipal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commis-
sion, or other separate unit of government created or established by
law ... .'6
The impetus for this broad grant of statutory authority came from
"[clertain local governments and local government organizations"
© 1992 by Barbara A. Petersen. All rights reserved.
* Staff Attorney, Florida Joint Legislative Information Technology Resource Committee;
B.G.S., 1979, University of Missouri; J.D., 1991, Florida State University. The author gratefully
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1. FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1991).
2. Ch. 90-237, 1990 Fla. Laws 1769 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.083 (1991)).
3. OFFICE OF THE Arr'y GEN., FLORIDA'S GOVERNMENT-IN-THE-SUNSHINE AND PUBLIC RE-
CORDS LAW MANUAL 70 (1990). Before enactment of § 119.083, it was not clear whether local
governments had the authority to copyright internally-created software. See, e.g., Staff of Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 2225 (1990) Staff Analysis 3 (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with
comm.) [hereinafter HB 2225 Staff Analysis].
4. See STAFF OF FLA. JT. LEcis. INFO. TEcH'Y RESOURCE COMM., FLORIDA'S INFORMATION
POLICY: PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN THE INFORMATION AGE 84 (1989) (on file with comm.) [herein-
after PROBLEMS AND Issuas].
5. FLA. STAT. § 119.083(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
6. Id. §§ 119.011(2), .083(l)(a) (.'Agency' has the same meaning as in s. 119.011(2). .
(1991).
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which argued "that they should be able to recoup costs for developing
software and possibly generate revenue from the sale of software." 7
Thus, the statute says an "agency that has obtained a copyright for
data processing software created by the agency may sell" or license
the copyrighted software at fees "based on market considerations.'' s
This right to copyright and sell agency-created software programs is
limited only by the statutory caveat that fees for software sold or li-
censed to an "individual or entity solely for application to data or
information maintained or generated" by that agency are subject to
the more proscriptive fee provisions of section 119.07(1). 9
The extent to which state and local government agencies in Florida
are making use of this extended authority to copyright software pro-
grams is discussed later in this Article. However, because federal
copyright law preempts any state-created rights within the general
scope of copyright,10 it is first necessary to consider the breadth and
application of the Federal Copyright Act of 197611 before analyzing
Florida's new copyright statute. Thus, Section II of this Article offers
a general overview of federal copyright law and Section III examines
its application to computer software programs. Section IV discusses
the issues raised by section 119.083, Florida Statutes, which grants
state agencies the right to copyright agency-created software. Section
IV also contains results of a survey conducted by the Florida Joint
Committee on Information Technology Resources (JCITR). The sur-
vey, which has been reprinted as an Appendix to this Article, explored
state and local government agencies' use and sale of agency-copy-
righted software. Finally, Section V draws conclusions from the anal-
ysis in Section IV.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW
As stated in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution,
the purpose of federal copyright law is "[tlo promote the Progress of
7. HB 2225 Staff Analysis, supra note 3, at 4.
8. FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3)(1991).
9. Id. Section 119.07(l)(a) allows an agency to recover only the actual cost of duplication;
§ 119.07(l)(b) authorizes collection of an additional special service charge for the extensive use
of information technology resources.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988); H.R. RaP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1976) [here-
inafter 1976 HousE REPORT]. See also Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888) ("No
authority exists for obtaining a copyright, beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized
it."); Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (1Ith Cir. 1983) (state regulation in the area of copy-
right is preempted by federal law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-20 (1988).
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Science and useful Arts.' 1 2 Because "encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors," copyright seeks to protect an artist's
or scientist's economic interests by a grant of exclusive-but limited-
controls over his or her work. These controls include the right to
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work, prepare derivative
works based on the original, and display or perform the work pub-
licly.' 4 These exclusive rights are qualified, however, by limitations
specified in the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.1 In other words, sub-
ject to express statutory limitations, the copyright owner has the right
to control when and in what manner a copyrighted work is dissemi-
nated to the public.
In stimulating the creation of intellectual works through economic
incentive, copyright seeks to balance an author's property rights in his
or her intellectual endeavors with the public's interest in the ideas ex-
pressed in those works. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted,
"we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create
the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incen-
tive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture,
and development."' 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has held: "To this end,
copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information con-
veyed by a work."'17
A. The Scope of Federal Copyright Protections: Original Works of
Authorship and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 protects "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."'"
12. Congress has the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Protection for inventors and their
"discoveries" is found in the U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
13. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Generally, a copyright "endures" for the
life of the author plus 50 years. See also 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
15. Id. §§ 107-20.
16. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
17. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 11l S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
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Originality is the sine qua non of copyright; to qualify for copyright
protection "a work must be original to the author."' 9 The amount of
originality required, though, is minimal; there is no requirement of
novelty or uniqueness. Rather, "[o]riginal, as the term is used in cop-
yright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity." 0
Additionally, the Federal Copyright Act of 1976 offers examples of
the types of original work that may be protected by copyright at 17
U.S.C. § 102(a). Because "technological developments have made
possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before,"
the statutory list of examples, which encompasses new expressive
forms including computer programs, is purposely illustrative rather
than exclusive. 2'
The scope of copyright is limited to original expression, however,
and does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery," regardless of its
form. 22 Therefore, "[tihe mere fact that a work is copyrighted does
not mean that every element of the work may be protected. ' 23 Using
computer programs as an example, copyright protects the "expressive
elements" of the program, but not "the ideas, processes, and methods
embodied in" the program.14 Thus, a computer program is copyright-
able only "to the extent that [it] incorporate[s] authorship in the pro-
grammer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the
ideas themselves." 25 Yet although the distinction between idea and
19. Feist, 11I S. Ct. at 1287.
20. Id.; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D.
Mass. 1990) ("'original' . . . refers to works that have been 'independently created by an au-
thor,' regardless of their literary or aesthetic merit, or ingenuity, or qualitative value") (quoting
1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 51).
21. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 51.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("copyright
... protection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself") (citation omit-
ted). While expression is protected by copyright, the idea is "dedicated by the author to the
public domain upon publication." Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663,
707. The idea/expression dichotomy was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, the Court held that although a particular accounting
method was an uncopyrightable idea, the book that described the method was copyrightable
expression. Id. at 105.
23. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991) (emphasis
added).
24. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 53.
25. 1976 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) ("No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates."); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir.
COPYRIGHT PROVISION
expression is a requisite threshold in nearly all copyright litigation,
"no one has been able to articulate how or where to find the elusive
line between 'idea' and 'expression' for software." 26 Because of this,
separating "the purpose or function" of a computer program-its
idea-from "everything that is not necessary to that purpose or func-
tion"-its expression-can be particularly difficult. 27
However, not all expression is copyrightable. In addition to the
minimal degree of originality required, the expression of an idea must
be separable from the idea itself. 28 That is, if there are only a limited
number of ways one may express a particular idea, then the expression
of that idea merges with the idea itself and cannot be copyrighted.2 9
For example, in more traditional literary works, "incidents, charac-
ters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at
least standard, in the treatment of a given topic" are not copyrighta-
ble;30 to allow copyright protection for such stock literary devices
would grant the first author a monopoly on "commonplace ideas."',
The rationale for this merger doctrine is rather simple: copyright pro-
tection for the expression of an idea so inextricably tied to the idea
itself as to be inseparable would, in effect, extend protection to the
underlying idea-a direct violation of section 102(b). 31
1986) ("It is axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas."),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
26. Pamela Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Software Copyright Law and
the Perils of Teaching It, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 61, 63 (1988). See also National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Final Report and Recom-
mendations (1978), reprinted in 5 CoPYRIGrr, CONGRESS AND TECsHNOLOGY: TE PUBLIC RECORD
1, 44 (N. Henry ed., 1980) [hereinafter CONTU Report] ("lilt is difficult, either as a matter of
legal interpretation- or technological determination, to draw the line between the copyrightable
element of style and expression in a computer program and the process [or idea] which underlies
it"). The idea/expression distinction in more traditional subjects of copyright is no less trouble-
some. According to Judge Learned Hand, "[niobody has ever been able to fix that boundary
[between idea and expression], and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
27. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (emphasis omitted); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer
Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (the idea/expression distinction, "difficult
and ad hoc in any case, is particularly difficult in the case of complex computer software")
(citations omitted); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1.03(3)(c)
(1991 Cumulative Supp. No. 2).
28. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58 (D. Mass.
1990).
29. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971);
NIMMER, supra note 27, § 103(3)(c).
30. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Atari, Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982).
31. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see also Kalpakian, 446 F.2d at 742 (protecting expres-
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As applied to computer programs, the merger doctrine becomes
compelling because "programmers generally strive to create programs
'that meet the user's needs in the most efficient manner,"' a concern
which "may so narrow the practical range of choice as to make only
one or two forms of expression workable options."33 Therefore, in the
context of computer programs:
copyrighted language may be copied without infringing when there is
but a limited number of ways to express a given idea .... [T]his
means that when specific instructions, even though previously
copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a
given task, their later use by another will not amount to
infringement.34
Thus, the question becomes whether "other programs can be writ-
ten or created which perform the same function as" the program at
issue, a question which must be answered on a case-by-case basis.3" In
sum, the "original and substantial" expressive elements of an idea
embodied in a computer program will be copyrightable if "the expres-
sion of [the] idea has elements that go beyond all functional elements
of the idea itself, and beyond the obvious, and if there are numerous
other ways of expressing the non-copyrightable idea." 36
B. Statutory Limitations on Exclusive Rights
There are statutory limitations on the scope of copyright as well.
The exclusive rights granted in 17 U.S.C. § 106-reproduction, distri-
bution, performance and display, and preparation of derivative
works-are subject to the specific limitations of sections 107-20.17 The
fair use provision of section 107, and the limitations on exclusive
rights for computer programs in section 117 are also particularly rele-
vant to this Article.
sion "in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner");
Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (ist Cir. 1967) (an idea "would be
appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression"); NnMERa, supra note 27, §
1.03(3)(c) ("if there is only one or a very limited number of ways to express an idea, copyright
must be denied in order to preserve free use and exchange of ideas").
33. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 61
U.S.L.W. 2003 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992) (citation omitted).
34. CONTU Report, supra note 26, at 20.
35. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
36. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990).
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
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1. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use
The fair use doctrine is defined as a "privilege" in someone other
than the owner of the copyright 'to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without [the owner's] consent."' 3 This doctrine
stipulates that the use of a copyrighted work for certain purposes such
as scholarship and research "is not an infringement of copyright." 3 9
As with the statutory limitations specified in the Federal Copyright
Act of 1976, the purpose of the fair use doctrine is to place limits on
the copyright owner's property rights, thereby encouraging creative
use of the protected material. 0 Therefore, application of the fair use
privilege entails balancing the "exclusive right of a copyright holder
with the public's interest in dissemination of information." 41
Under the Federal Copyright Act of 1976, the determination of
whether a given use of a copyrighted work is fair requires considera-
tion of the following factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.42
These statutory factors, which are used by the courts in determining
whether a particular use should be considered fair and reasonable, re-
quire a case-specific analysis. A finding of fair use will defeat a claim
of copyright infringement.43
2. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Computer Programs
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 provides that a computer pro-
gram may be copied or adapted by the owner if it is necessary to the
38. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (citation omitted).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (emphasis added).
40. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1059 (1987).
41. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
43. Id.
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utilization of the program, or is for archival purposes only." Al-
though this limitation is much narrower than that found in the fair
use provision, section 117 acts to "ensure that rightful possessors of
copies of computer programs may use or adapt the[] programs for
their use," and favors the public interest over the copyright owner's
exclusive property rights. 45 Thus, an otherwise infringing use that fits
into either of these two narrowly-drawn categories will not, like a
finding of fair use, violate a valid copyright.
C. Copyright Infringement
Subject to the express statutory limitations in sections 107-20, viola-
tion of any of the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 consti-
tutes infringement. 46 To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a
plaintiff must prove both ownership of a valid copyright and the de-
fendant's unauthorized copying of the protected material.47
1. Copyright Ownership
A certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of the copyright.4 8 However, even though the
U.S. Copyright Office is responsible for making an initial finding of
copyrightability and registering copyright claims, the courts ultimately
determine what is copyrightable through litigation. 49 Thus, when the
Copyright Office registers a copyright claim, "neither the public nor
the courts should assume that the Copyright Office has made a deter-
mination that individual component parts of the work are necessarily
entitled to copyright protection." 0
44. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1992). It should be noted that the Federal Copyright
Act of 1976 makes a distinction between "[ojwnership of a copyright" and "ownership of any
material object in which the work is embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
45. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). Jurisdiction over infringement actions is given exclusively to the
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
47. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); MELVILLE B. NDIMuER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT §
141.1 (1964). Intent is not necessary for a finding of infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
Rather, intent is considered only in establishing the proper statutory damage award. Id. §
504(c)(2). Under § 504(c)(2), a copyright owner who proves willful (intentional) infringement
may collect as much as $ 100,000 per incident in statutory damages.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988). Although copyright protection is not dependent upon regis-
tration, a claim of infringement cannot be brought until registration has been made. Id. §§
408(a), 411 (a).
49. See id. §§ 409, 410(a), (c); Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Register of Copyrights
at 7, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, No. 90-11662-K, 1992 WL 186062 (D. Mass. July 2,
1990) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae].
50. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 49, at 16.
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In other words, copyright registration merely creates a presumption
that the subject matter is copyrightable-a presumption that may be
overcome by "evidence which brings into question the copyrightabil-
ity of the work.'"'
2. Unauthorized Copying
Having established ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff must
next offer proof of unauthorized copying of the protected work. Be-
cause direct evidence may be difficult to produce, copying is most of-
ten established by indirect evidence showing not only the defendant's
access to the copyrighted work, but, more importantly, that the simi-
larity between the two works is substantial enough to support an in-
ference of copying. 2 The determination of whether the copying
appropriated significant portions of the copyrighted work dictates a
quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis, balancing "the substan-
tive interests of [the] author against the free flow of ideas and technol-
ogy for use by others."53
Generally, the test for determining substantial similarity is a two-
step process that requires first, a determination of whether the
amount of similarity between the two works supports a conclusion
that the protected work was copied, and second, whether the copying
was prohibited. 4 The first step in this process requires expert testi-
mony; the second the testimony of the average lay observer.55 Because
of the intricate technical issues inherent in software infringement
51. Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,
456 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th
Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986)). Presumably, evidence of an invalid registration
under chapter four of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976 or a violation of § 102 (such as im-
proper subject matter or a non-copyrightable expression) would defeat a presumption of valid-
ity. See id. at 464.
52. See, e.g., id.; Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231-32
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.0314]. In Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977),
access was defined as the "opportunity to view or to copy" the copyrighted work. However, the
court also stated that "[njo amount of proof of access will suffice to show copying if there are
no similarities." Id. Only copying is prohibited by the Copyright Act; a work that is indepen-
dently created-even if identical to the copyrighted work-will not infringe the copyright. See
NImmER, supra note 27, § 1.03[4].
53. Nim aER, supra note 27, § 1.03[4].
54. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-9 (2d Cir. 1946); Amy B. Cohen, Masking
Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 719 (1987) (discussing application of Arnstein to computer program infringement). An oth-
erwise infringing use of copyrighted material may be permitted if it falls within one of the statu-
tory limitations contained in sections 107-20 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976. See supra
notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
55. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
19921
450 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:441
litigation, many courts have rejected this two-prong test, and have re-
lied heavily-and almost exclusively-on expert testimony. 6 Regard-
less of whether substantial similarity is found, however, any
"similarity of expression ... which necessarily results from the fact
that the common idea is only capable of expression in more or less
stereotyped form" will preclude a finding of infringement under the
merger doctrine.57
Because "[c]omputer software is comprised of component parts,
each of which may be separately copyrightable," the complexity of
traditional copyright law is compounded when applied to computer
software programs." And, although the copyrightability of the differ-
ent program components is well-settled, questions concerning the
proper scope of copyright protection for software are far from an-
swered .59
3. Remedies for Infringement
The various remedies available for copyright infringement are out-
lined in the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.60 A court may order an
injunction "on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright." '6' A court may also order the
impounding or destruction of all violative copies. 62 Monetary damages
may also be awarded. The court awards either actual damages, in the
amount of damage actually suffered by the copyright owner as a re-
sult of the infringement plus any profits made by the infringer, or
statutory damages, which are capped at either $20,000 or $100,000,
depending on the willfulness of the violation. 63
56. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246; Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 61 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992).
57. NIsamrEsR, supra note 47, § 143.11. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) ("there[J must be substantial similarity
not only of the general ideas but of the expression[] of those ideas as well"). For a discussion of
the merger doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
58. Leslie Myles-Sanders, Who Owns the Software? Intellectual Property in the Computer
Industry After CCNV v. Reid, 70 MIcH. B.J. 664, 667 (1991).
59. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982)
(copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established); Samuelson, supra note 26, at 61-2;
Patricia Keefe, Software Copyright a Mixed Bag, COMPUTERWEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 35.
60. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-11 (1988).
61. Id. § 502. Proof of irreparable harm is not required for a preliminary injunction when a
plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of infringement or show a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1254 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
63. Id. § 504. Under § 504, a copyright owner may elect to recover statutory damages rather
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III. COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROGRAMS
After more than twenty years of consideration and study, Congress
enacted a revised copyright act in 1976 which offered copyright pro-
tection to new forms of creative expression and communication made
possible by developments in technology." Although the 1976 Act did
not make specific reference to the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams, legislative history makes it clear that programs were meant to
be governed by the new act.65 Based on a concern that the proposed
copyright act might not adequately address problems raised by com-
puter technology," Congress created the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).67 CON-
TU's mission was to recommend changes in copyright law necessary
to ensure protection for computer programs."
A. CONTU and the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980
CONTU, in its Final Report to Congress, concluded that the Fed-
eral Copyright Act of 1976 provided adequate protection for com-
puter programs, but recommended that the copyright law be amended
"to make it explicit [that computer] programs, to the extent that they
embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of
copyright." 9 Although the CONTU report "did not propose any stat-
utory changes with respect to copyrightability of computer pro-
grams," 70 it recommended two changes to the 1976 Act: the addition
of a definition of "computer program" to section 101, and the repeal
of section 117, to be replaced with a new section limiting the copyright
owner's exclusive rights in computer programs. 7 ' These two
than actual damages plus profits. Section 504(c)(1) sets a range of from $500 to $20,000, "as the
court considers just." Section 504(c)(2) allows damages up to $100,000 in cases where the court
finds that "infringement was committed willfully."
64. Federal Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-20 (1988)). See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,
48 (D. Mass. 1990); 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 5l; NIwER, supra note 27, § 1.0312].
65. See 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 54 (the term "literary works" includes com-
puter programs); see also id. at 116 (the 1976 Act encompasses "copyrightability of computer
programs").
66. See id. at 116.
67. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1874 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 201 (1974)).
68. Id.
69. CONTU Report, supra note 26, at 1.
70. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 50 (D. Mass. 1990).
71. CONTU Report, supra note 26, at 12. Section 101 of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976
defines a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of amended § 117.
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recommendations were adopted by Congress with only slight modifi-
cation and formed the basis of the Computer Software Copyright Act
of 1980.72
Enactment of the Computer Software Copyright Act and the subse-
quent amendment of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976 seem to have
generated more questions than answers regarding the application of
traditional copyright protection to computer software programs. This
is in part because a certain amount of similarity and standardization
among computer programs is desirable, if not mandated. 73 As a result,
many commentators believe that application of traditional copyright
law to this new form of technology is inappropriate, and they have
called for a new form of intellectual property law specific to computer
technology.74
Additionally, while the CONTU Final Report advocated copyright
protection for computer programs and emphasized the fundamental
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
process and idea, it did not explicitly define the scope of protection
for software and did not offer any guidelines for distinguishing be-
tween protected expression and an unprotected process or idea.75 This
lack of direction has led to disagreement among the appellate circuits
and to a great deal of confusion in the software industry about the
exact scope of protection for computer programs. Indeed, the prob-
lem is such that one commentator has suggested that "the scope of
software copyright protection . . . depend[s], at least in part, upon
geography." 76
B. The Scope of Software Copyright Protection
One of the first issues that arose after amendment of the Federal
Copyright Act of 1976 was whether all computer programs, regardless
72. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). Because of its direct relationship to the enact-
ment of the Computer Software Copyright Act, the CONTU Final Report is frequently used by
the courts as a form of legislative history. See NIMM R, supra note 27, § 1.03[2] n. 28; W. David
Taylor, III, Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Software After Whelan Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 54 Mo. L. REv. 121, 135 (1989).
73. See Samuelson, supra note 26, at 65 ("progress in the technological arts is more often
promoted by standardization"); Keefe, supra note 59, at 35.
74. See. e.g., Samuelson, supra note 26, at 71-73; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRE S, OTA-TCT No. 527, FINDING A BALANCE: CoMPUTER SOFrTW E, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CIANOE (May 1992) [hereinafter FINDING A
BALANCE).
75. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.0311; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 50 (D. Mass. 1990).
76. Esther R. Schachter, Software Protection in the Throes of a Legal Morass, 33 DATAMA-
nON, June 1, 1987, at 49, 56.
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of form or function, were copyrightable."1 The basic principle "that
all computer programs which meet the threshold requirements of the
[19761 Act can be protected by copyright, regardless of their form,
their function, or their fixation in a given medium" evolved from a
number of early software copyright cases.78
In the next generation of cases, however, the federal appellate
courts faced more difficult issues, including the actual scope of copy-
right protection for computer software programs, and "the proper
test for infringement in software cases." ' 79 The first of these second-
generation cases, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,0
was a landmark decision representing the 'farthest extension' of
copyright protection of software by the courts to date."8'
In Whelan the Third Circuit grappled with the idea/expression di-
chotomy as applied to copyright of computer software, and deter-
mined that "the purpose or function" of a computer program is its
uncopyrightable idea, and that which "is not necessary to that pur-
pose or function" of the program is the copyrightable expression of
the idea. 82 Concluding that "Itihe 'expression of the idea' in a soft-
ware computer program is the manner in which the program operates,
controls and regulates the computer," the Whelan court held that
copyright protection of a computer program may extend beyond the
program's literal code to its structure, sequence, and organization-
the program's expression as broadly defined by the Whelan court.13
Although the Whelan holding has been followed by a number of
courts in determining the scope of copyright protection for software
programs, other courts have rejected it. Less than six months after
Whelan was decided, the Fifth Circuit, in Plains Cotton Cooperative
Association v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., rejected the
77. See generally Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (program written in object code and operating
system program both copyrightable); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d
Cir. 1982) (object code copyrightable). Generally, computer programs are written in source code,
which is more intelligible to humans, and are then translated into object code for use by the
computer. Application programs serve to help the computer user perform specific tasks; operat-
ing system programs, on the other hand, manage the computer's internal functions. Apple, 714
F.2d at 1243.
78. Taylor, supra note 72, at 130-32 (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
81. Taylor, supra note 72, at 121 (citations omitted).
82. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
83. Id. at 1238-40 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 456 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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Whelan holding, relying instead on a Texas district court case which
held that the organization of a program, or its "input formats," was
an idea, not an expression, and "thus w[as] not protected by copy-
right."85 More recently, a district court in the Second Circuit criticized
the Whelan decision as being too simplistic and, finding the Whelan
test fundamentally flawed, flatly rejected it as "inadequate and inac-
curate. "6
In addition to the still unsettled issues of scope and the idea/expres-
sion distinction addressed in Whelan and Plains Cotton, a number of
other unresolved-and equally complicated-legal issues are currently
challenging both the courts and the software industry. These issues
include whether the underlying structure of computer programs, user
interface formats, and the functionality of programs are part of the
program's protectable expression; and whether a copyright is in-
fringed by user modifications to copyrighted software.87
As long as these issues remain unresolved, "true predictability in
matters of software copyright remains out of reach,""8 and software
vendors-whether private corporations or public agencies, defen-
dants, or plaintiffs-will continue to use litigation as a means of de-
fining the scope of copyright protection for computer programs. 9
IV. IssuEs
A. The Rampant Rise in Litigation and the Cost of Protecting a
Copyright: Issues Associated with the Copyright of Agency-Created
Software
A government agency has a number of alternatives in procuring
new software programs to meet its needs. It may purchase off-the-
85. 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (citing Synercom Tech-
nology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978)). Compare
Samuelson, supra note 26, at 64-65 (Plains Cotton explicitly rejects Whelan holding), and Tay-
lor, supra note 72, at 149 (Plains Cotton and Whelan reconcilable).
86. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd, 61 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992). Specifically, the district court, noting "that
there is no necessary relationship between the sequence of operations in a program, which are
part of behavior, and the order or sequence in which those operations are set[] in the text of the
program," criticized Whelan for using the terms structure, sequence, and organization inter-
changeably. Id. This court also found that "(s]ince the behavior aspect of a computer program
falls within the statutory terms 'process,' 'system,' and 'method of operation,' it may be ex-
cluded by statute from copyright protection." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
87. Samuelson, supra note 26, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
88. Taylor, supra note 72, at 154.
89. See, e.g., Peter Krass, Why So Many Lawsuits?, INFORMAnONWEEK, June 3, 1991, at
40,44.
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shelf software, it may enter into an agreement with a third party for
custom-developed software, or it may develop its own software in-
house.
With the enactment of section 119.083, Florida Statutes, any Flor-
ida agency that develops its own software, or retains the right to copy-
right custom-developed software under contract with a third party,
may now copyright and market those software programs. According
to a recent survey of state and local government agencies conducted
by the Florida Joint Legislative Committee on Information Technol-
ogy Resources (JCITR) on the use and sale of agency-copyrighted
software, 249, or 62%, of the 401 agencies responding had developed
software in-house, with 13% attempting to copyright the software. 9°
Nearly one-fourth (eighty-five) obtained the copyright on software de-
veloped for the agency by a third party. 9' Although thirty-six agencies
reported that they had attempted to copyright software developed by
or for the agency, only twenty marketed agency-copyrighted software
through sale or license.92 Of those twenty agencies, twelve reported
having actually sold or licensed copyrighted software for more than
the actual cost of duplication.93
The effects of a decision to enter the software market with agency-
copyrighted programs may be widespread and long-lasting, and a
number of issues should be considered before an agency commits it-
self to such a course of action.
1. Defining Rights and Enforcing Copyright
If an agency is going to market its copyrighted software, it must be
willing to protect its copyright against potential piracy. This means
some agency resources must be devoted to enforcing its copyrights
against infringement. In addition, software development procedures
must be designed to prevent infringing on the rights of others. Law-
suits over protection of intellectual property rights are proliferating at
an alarming rate-more than 6,700 were filed in 1990, an increase of
almost 60% in just a decade.9 And the legal costs for such suits seem
90. See Appendix, infra, at 476, 477.
91. See Appendix, infra, at 476.
92. See Appendix, infra, at 477, 480.
93. See Appendix, infra at 480.
94. See Anne S. Gallagher, Software Suits: Who Wins?, INFORMATIONWEEK, Oct. 21, 1991,
at 84. One software developer, Autodesk, reports it has more than 300 copyright infringement
cases currently pending, and has resolved more than 4,000 cases in the last four years. See Jim
McNair, Software Hardball: Industry Takes Offensive Against Piracy, MmAmi HERALD, June 5,
1992, at Cl, C5. In addition, according to a survey of predominantly U.S. companies on how
such companies safeguard their intellectual property, 67% of those responding stated they "are
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to be rising exponentially. According to various estimates, litigating a
complex intellectual property claim can cost from $260,000 to more
than $2 million. 95 An attorney who specializes in computer law pre-
dicts, "If you're in the computer business, the question now isn't how
you'll get sued but when." 96
In the software industry in particular, copyright "[l]itigation is be-
coming a business tactic, not a practice of last resort.' '9 Some com-
mentators cite the increase in competition among software vendors as
a reason for this increase in competition; 9 others point to the confu-
sion in both the industry and the courts over the actual scope of copy-
right protection." Software developers "also point to the difficulty of
ascertaining whether a new software product violates an existing ...
copyright" as a reason for the increase in litigation.100 Yet whatever
the reason, it is clear that software developers 'view intellectual
property rights as a business tool for the 1990s,' and that the willing-
ness-and, some might say, eagerness-to enforce a copyright is con-
sidered vital to protect a valuable asset.' 0' In light of this, agency
response to JCITR survey questions concerning steps taken to guard
against infringement seems rather simplistic, and perhaps even a bit
naive. Of those Florida agencies copyrighting software, 75% stated
that they do not have a regular, consistent plan for protecting against
infringement of software copyright. 0 2 More startling is the fact that
fewer than one-fourth of the agencies actually take steps to ensure
engaged in litigation to protect or defend" their intellectual property rights. The survey was
conducted by the Conference Board, a non-profit international business information service. See
Ronald E. Berenbeim, Safeguarding Intellectual Property: A Report from the Conference
Board, 924 CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT 15 (1989).
95. See Gallagher, supra note 94, at 84. Altai, Inc., a small software vendor from Arling-
ton, Texas, incurred $2.5 million in legal expenses in successfully defending itself against a claim
of copyright infringement brought by Computer Associates International. Robert Moran, Soft-
ware Copyrights: Ruling Narrows Protection, INFORKATIONWEEK, June 29, 1992, at 15; see also
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 61 U.S.L.W.
2003 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992).
96. Julia King, It's C. Y.A. Time, 26 COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 13, 1992, at 85 (quoting Au-
gust Bequai, an attorney specializing in computer law).
97. Mitch Kapor, Litigation vs. Innovation, 5 BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 520.
98. See, e.g., Krass, supra note 89, at 40, 44.
99. See, e.g., id. at 44; Schachter, supra note 76, at 50-51 (the exact limits of copyright
protection have not been determined).
100. Krass, supra note 89, at 44.
101. Gallagher, supra note 94, at 84 (quoting Mark P. Whine, intellectual property lawyer
with the Minneapolis-based firm Oppenheimer Wolff & Donnelly). According to a White Paper
on software piracy prepared by the Software Publishers Association, the software industry had
annual U.S. revenues of $4 billion in 1990, and lost $2.4 billion to piracy in the United States
alone. SoF'TwARE PunusHaRs Ass'N, WroTE PAPER (April 1992).
102. See Appendix, infra, at 479.
COPYRIGHT PROVISION
that agency-created software will not infringe on the software copy-
rights of others. 03 However, at the time the survey was taken, in Feb-
ruary 1992, only two agencies had a copyright infringement suit
threatened or filed against them. °4
2. Liability
Under current federal law, copyrighting agency-created software
may result in unexpected exposure to liability for the producing
agency, and marketing that software is certain to increase the risk.
States have not always faced such exposure, however. Before 1990,
government agencies were generally held immune from copyright in-
fringement actions based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to prohibit a citizen of
a state from suing the state-or one of its employees when acting in
his or her official capacity-for tort liability, unless the state had ex-
pressly waived its immunity to suit.0 5 A number of states have used
their Eleventh Amendment immunity to defeat claims for damages
under the Federal Copyright Act of 1976. In B. V. Engineering v.
UCLA, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's claim against
professors at UCLA for copyright infringement.1 6 In closing, the
court recognized that its holding would "allow states to violate the
federal copyright laws with virtual impunity," and called on Congress
to remedy the problem.10 Congress responded by enacting the Copy-
right Remedy Clarification Act of 1990.108 The purpose of the new
legislation, which amends the Federal Copyright Act of 1976, is "to
clearly and explicitly abrogate State sovereign immunity to permit the
recovery of money damages against States."''09 Thus, a state and its
officers and employees are no longer immune from damages for
103. See Appendix, infra, at 479.
104. See Appendix, infra, at 479.
105. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987) (citing
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)).
106. 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). See also Richard
Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033
(1989).
107. UCLA, 858 F.2d at 1400.
108. Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104. Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (Supp. II
1990)).
109. H.R. REP. No. 282(1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3949, 3950.
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copyright infringement, and they are now subject to the same reme-
dies for copyright violation as private persons or entities. 1 0
Public employees may also be at risk of personal liability. In Flor-
ida, a governmental employee cannot be held liable "as a result of any
act, event, or omission of action in the scope of his employment or
function . . . . "" But because federal law preempts state law within
the general area of copyright, "state law cannot provide immunity to
persons sued for violating the Copyright Act .... 1112
In addition to the risk of liability for copyright infringement, agen-
cies that copyright and market software may be exposing themselves
to liability for programs which do not function as warranted or antici-
pated." 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed the opin-
ion that a manufacturer of defective computer software might be
subject to strict liability. 1 4 Under strict liability theory, a seller is sub-
ject to liability for damages "even though he has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of the product."ItS
3. Limitations on Development and Hidden Costs
Government agencies have an obvious incentive for developing mar-
ketable software in-house. Rather than budgeting agency funds for
the purchase of software, an agency can accomplish its mission with
programs produced in-house while simultaneously benefitting from
potentially profitable sales of the copyrighted software to third par-
ties. However, this requires well-defined, written policies on when in-
house development is an appropriate alternative to purchase, as well
as internal or external controls on funds diverted from other agency
tasks into software development." 6
110. 17 U.S.C. § 511 (Supp. 111990).
111. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1991).
112. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 1988), cerl. de-
nied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). In Richard Anderson, which was heard before the enactment of the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, the Fourth Circuit held that a state employee could be held
personally liable for a claim of copyright infringement even though the state was immune from
the same claim. Id. "The mere fact that [the employee's] conduct was undertaken in the course
of her state employment does not ... relieve her of individual liability .... " Id.
113. See King, supra note 96, at 85 ("As consumers, businesses and courts look to assign
blame in cases where technology [has] run[] amok, firms may1 find themselves liable for errors
caused by faulty software and systems.").
114. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1963).
116. An early draft of Florida's new copyright statute provided that all funds obtained by an
agency from licensing or selling copyrighted software would be deposited in an account ear-
marked for data processing or information resources management. HB 2225 Staff Analysis, su-
pra note 3, at 1. As passed, however, the statute contained no such provision. Instead, state
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An agency that decides to market its copyrighted software must also
consider the hidden costs of competing in a commercial market. These
costs include debugging, technical support for purchasers, upgrades,
and new releases. All too often, the cost of software is "erroneously
considered to be the cost of initial development." 1 1 7 However, the cost
of software development does not end when development is completed
and the marketing phase begins. Instead, costs continue to increase as
"a result of the maintenance that is required for software, whether it
is corrective, adaptive, perfective, or preventative maintenance." 118
Therefore, in successfully marketing copyrighted software it is impor-
tant for an agency to recognize what may be significant post-produc-
tion maintenance costs in addition to the initial costs of software
development.119
When asked by the JCITR survey to mark all factors that the
agency considers in establishing the sale or license price for agency-
created software, 4807o of those agencies copyrighting and marketing
software chose the cost of duplication, and an equal number consid-
ered personnel time as a pricing factor.120 Other factors considered in-
cluded market considerations (35%); costs of production materials
(22%); marketing and promotional costs (17%); profit margin or rev-
enue generation (17%); and rent and utility costs (9010).121 Although
the cost of maintenance was not a factor specifically listed in the sur-
vey, there was an "Other" category in which a responding agency was
asked to describe any other factors it considered which were not
listed. Six of the twenty-three agencies (26%) that answered this ques-
tion chose "Other," but not one listed -maintenance as a price factor
even though the agencies were asked about the types of maintenance
or support provided. 12
agencies "may" deposit their proceeds in an agency trust fund, and "[clounties, municipalities,
and other political subdivisions of the state may designate how such sale and licensing proceeds
are to be used." FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3) (1991). These proceeds represent a new source of reve-
nue for agencies, independent of legislative control or oversight. For statistical information on
how agencies are spending their software copyright revenues, see Section V. of the JCITR sur-
vey, Appendix, infra, at 480.
117. Jill S. Weaver, A Model for the Total Cost of Software p.v. (1991) (unpublished M.
Sci. thesis, Fla. State Univ.).
118. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
119. According to one estimate, companies that develop and market software devote approx-
imately 70% of available programming resources to support and maintenance. CRAG JENSEN,
THE CRAFT OF COMPUTER PEOORAMMINo 291 (1985); JhAMES MARTnq & CARMA McCLuRa, SORT-
WARE MAINTENANCE: THE PROBLEM AN ITS SOLUTIONS 9 (1983) (corporate data processing or-
ganizations spend 80% of their time on program maintenance).
120. See Appendix, infra, at 481.
121. See Appendix, infra, at 481.
122. See Appendix, infra, at 481. One agency that checked "Other" stated that it did not
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4. Private Sector Competition
In contrast to private sector software developers, a government
agency that copyrights and markets its software does not depend upon
the need for profit. As a result, private sector competition may be
stifled by public agencies offering similar software at a price below
what non-public software producers can offer. As one author states,
[i]t is frequently assumed that government can produce information
products and services comparable to those available from the private
sector at the same or lower cost. There is no evidence to support this
assumption. It is true that government can sell information for less.
This is because the price is subsidized by taxpayer dollars-not
because the cost of production is less. ,23
There is no sure road map for governmental success either. How
does or should a government agency price a product when the ordi-
nary rules of free enterprise do not apply? Should a premium piece of
software be marketed at an above-average price in an attempt to seek
higher profits? Should it be priced below cost to drive competitors out
of the market? Should the initial program be inexpensive, with the
profits coming from later upgrades once a purchaser is committed to a
particular program through purchases and staff training? Alterna-
tively, in establishing the "true" price of a program, what effort
should be expended in determining the proportion of agency office
rent, personnel costs, and other expenses attributable to software de-
velopment and paid for by public revenues?
Many private sector software developers worry that public agencies
marketing copyrighted software will seek full-fledged competition
with the private sector without providing a level playing field. In com-
menting before the House Governmental Operations Committee on
Florida's software copyright bill, a report from the Information In-
dustry Association (IIA) stated:
actively market its copyrighted software. Twenty-three agencies responded to the survey question
on types of software support and maintenance provided. In the category of technical support, 14
agencies provided technical support by telephone; six by mail; three in person at the agency
office; and three provided technical support at the buyer's place of business. Ten of the agencies
offered training-eight of the 10 at the buyer's office, and six at the agency's. Other types of
support provided included development of program upgrades (nine agencies); debugging (eight);
customization of software programs (four); and software installation (five). In addition, three
agencies reported that support is provided by a third party through a contract with the agency.
Interestingly, two agencies reported that they do not provide any support for the software they
copyright and market, responding that the software is sold "as is." See Appendix, infra, at 482.
123. Kenneth B. Allen, Access to Government Information, 9 Gov'T INFO. Q. 67, 74 (1992).
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One question the Legislature should ask is whether it serves the
public interest to give so many diverse agencies so much incentive to
devote public resources to the development and marketing of such a
wide range of computer software. Since the legislation does not
appear to be limited to software necessary to support the agency's
mission, the temptation to divert resources into potentially profitable
software ventures could prove overwhelming to some agencies.' 24
Although none of the agencies responding to the JCITR survey
have succumbed to the temptation described by the 11A, the potential
for abuse exists, 12 and government agencies have distinct advantages
over their private sector competitors. These advantages include ex-
emption from certain taxes, overhead costs that are not easily attribut-
able and thus are not allocable to software development, and freedom
from the necessity of generating revenue to ensure survival of the or-
ganization.
B. Public Policy and the Problems Inherent in Government-Held
Copyrights
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976 precludes copyright protection
for any work of the federal government, the rationale being that to
allow "government copyright would only restrict free dissemination
of valuable government information.' '126 Rooted in the traditional
First Amendment tenet that a strong and viable democracy is depend-
ent upon a well-informed citizenry, this statutory prohibition attests
to the .'conclusion by Congress that the public interest is served by
keeping governmently created work as free as possible of potential re-
striction on []dissemination .... 111127 There is no corresponding pro-
hibition on state governments in the 1976 Act; thus, works of state
124. Report from Info. Indus. Ass'n to Fla. H. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., Comments on Pro-
posed Software Copyright Legislation 5 (Jan. 10, 1990) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Report
from Info. Indus. Ass'nl.
125. The statutory language in § 119.083 is quite broad, and nothing in the statute precludes
an agency from developing software not required "to support the agency's mission." FLA. STAT.
§ 119.083(2) (1991).
126. Maurice B. Stiefel, Note, Piracy in High Places- Government Publications and Copy-
right Law, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 423, 433 (1956); see also James L. Swanson, Copyright
Versus the First Amendment: Forecasting an End to the Storm, 7 Lov. ENT. L.J. 263, 270
(1987). Although the federal government is prohibited from obtaining copyright, it may, how-
ever, receive and hold "copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise." 17
U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
127. Committee No. 308, Copyrights Division, Gov't Relations to Copyright, 1989 A.B.A.
SEc. PAT. TRADSMARK & CoPYRiOtT 195, 206 (citing Letter from David Ladd, Register of Copy-
rights, to Sen. Charles M. Mathias (Oct. 11, 1983), reprinted in 1984 House FOIA Legislative
Hearings at 1138)) [hereinafter Gov't Relations to Copyright].
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governments may be copyrightable, "depending on state law and pol-
icy, and 'subject to exceptions dictated by public policy.' governing
federal copyright law.' 21 In authorizing its agencies to hold copyright,
then, a state legislature must recognize the fundamental principles of
federal copyright law, and should make a clear statement of its own
policy in accordance with those principles.
Central to any discussion of public policy is the notion that federal
copyright law is not based upon an author's exclusive right to his writ-
ings, but upon the idea that science and arts will be promoted and the
public best served by granting authors a limited monopoly on their
creative efforts. 29 Copyright law focuses on an individual's right to
reap the reward of his or her efforts;1 30 it seeks to protect an author's
economic incentive to create by granting a monopoly limited in both
time and scope, yet broad enough to allow the author to realize an
economic return, thereby encouraging production of new and innova-
tive work.'3 ' However, "[a] competing concern is the recognition that
free and unrestrained access to the works of others encourages a
greater dispersion of knowledge," which "hastens the development or
discovery of new ideas and theories" and greatly enhances the public
welfare.1 2 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
the contribution and corresponding benefit to the public welfare is the
"'primary object in conferring the copyright monopoly"' ;133 without
such benefit, the copyright monopoly would be detrimental to society
as a whole. Therefore, public policy-based on constitutional princi-
ples-requires that "the copyright 'system of rewards is to be no more
extensive than is necessary . to elicit a socially [optimal] amount of
creative activity."' ,34
128. See Building Officials& Code Adm'rs v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735-36
(1st Cir. 1980) (quoting A.AN LATMAN, THE COPYRIOHT LAW 43 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis
added). Case law may limit a state's right to copyright its work, however. See, e.g., Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (state court opinions are in the public domain and cannot be
copyrighted); Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61 (D. Minn. 1866) (rejecting copyright on state
statutes).
129. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 HousE REPORT];
see also John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1021, 1023
(1989) (purpose of copyright is "to generate a public benefit," not to protect natural right of
author).
130. Andrea Simon, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commis-
sioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 425, 442 (1984) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574 (1977)).
131. Beryl R. Jones, Copyright: Factual Compilations and The Second Circuit, 52 BROOK.
L. REv. 679, 688 (1986).
132. Id. at 689.
133. See Simon, supra note 130, at 439 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932)).
134. Id. at 440 (quoting United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975)). Cf.
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The tension created by balancing the individual author's economic
interests with the public's interest in dissemination is an inherent as-
pect of copyright protection, and, because of this, enactment of a law
authorizing copyright by state agencies requires consideration of two
questions: "First, how much will the legislation stimulate the pro-
ducer and so benefit the public; and second, how much will the mo-
nopoly granted be detrimental to the public?"' 35
1. Economic Issues
The incentive-based rationale for copyright protection "assumes
that copyright is needed to prompt authors to undertake creative la-
bors."13 6
A government agency, however, produces its potentially copyrighta-
ble works "to promote the general welfare, independent of any need
for economic benefit, and since salaries both induce and compensate
government employees for their efforts,"' one must seriously ques-
tion the need to offer copyright protection for government-created
works.
Notwithstanding the incentive rationale, government copyright is
frequently viewed as a potential source of much-needed revenue. For
example, supporters of the legislation creating section 119.083, Flor-
ida Statutes, which authorizes government agencies to sell or license
copyrighted data processing software at market value, argued that
copyright would allow state agencies to recoup development costs and
generate revenue. 13 In light of the strong public policy arguments fa-
voring dissemination of information over protection of an author's
property right, however, an argument supporting copyright protection
based only on generation of revenue seems insufficient. Rather,
"[wihat we want to know is the extent to which less revenue will, in
fact, mean less production... [and] to what extent is [copyright] pro-
tection likely to be necessary in order to secure production."'3 9
Kidwell, supra note 129, at 1023 ("The [copyright] reward should not exceed that necessary to
stimulate the necessary investment in either authoring or publishing.").
135. See 1909 HousE REPORT, supra note 129, at 7.
136. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1908 (1990) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954)).
137. Simon, supra note 130, at 440 (emphasis added).
138. See HB 2225 Staff Analysis, supra note 3, at 4.
139. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFOATION 62 (1986) (statement of Hon. Stephen Breyer,
Circuit Judge, First Circuit Court of Appeals, Boston, Mass., before the Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on
the Judiciary) (emphasis added) [hereinafter OTA, INrELLECTUAX PROPERTY RoHTs].
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Presumably, a government agency in Florida is producing only that
software essential to agency operation in furtherance of its public du-
ties, and would produce such software regardless of the potential eco-
nomic or commercial incentives for the agency.
2. First Amendment Concerns
The goals of both copyright law and the First Amendment, which
courts have traditionally held protect the right to receive informa-
tion,'14 seem complementary. Each strives in its own way to encourage
expression, thereby "increasing exposure to ideas and enriching demo-
cratic discourse.' ' 4' Yet, in encouraging production and dissemina-
tion, copyright-which allows an author the exclusive right to
determine access to the protected work-may actually limit public ac-
cess to information. In so doing, copyright protection directly con-
flicts with the First Amendment goal of encouraging the free flow of
ideas. 142
Because "[n]o expression is more relevant to the vitality of the dem-
ocratic dialogue than works of the ... [g]overnment,"' 41 the potential
for conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment increases
significantly when government seeks to protect its own work through
copyright. Broad and unobstructed dissemination of government
works "serves the enlightenment function of the First Amendment,"
which is easily frustrated if government is given a copyright monopoly
on its output that "might well be used to withhold certain works from
the public."'" In such situations, the First Amendment "may well
preclude copyright." 45
At the very least, copyright protection for government works may
inhibit meaningful public access. In this electronic age, access to the
software which controls and manipulates a government data base may
be as important as access to the data base itself. In Florida the Fourth
District Court of Appeal analogized a software program used to ac-
cess information stored in a computer to a code book necessary for
140. Simon, supra note 130, at 446 n.115 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
141. Id. at 446. See also Swanson, supra note 126, at 263 ("Copyright gives authors the
incentive to create; the First Amendment gives them the right to communicate.").
142. See Simon, supra note 130, at 447.
143. Swanson, supra note 126, at 270.
144. Id. See also Simon, supra note 130, at 452 n.155 (copyright is viewed as "a device to
screen and select users, stifle criticism and prevent access to materials").
145. See I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.06[BI[4], at 5-
58 n.29 (1992).
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meaningful interpretation of government data.'4 Thus, "[it would be
unreasonable to give a person a message in code without supplying a
code book to decipher the message, and it would be equally unreasona-
ble to provide public records without supplying the program to access
them." 147 Similarly, software has been compared to "the key that un-
locks the information, that removes the cap from the lens. ' ' 4
Although section 119.083 allows an agency to copyright and market
the software it creates, a provision in the statute precludes an agency
from denying or restricting public access to the software "for applica-
tion to data or information maintained or generated by the agency
,.. ,, Nevertheless, according to the JCITR survey of public record
custodians on the use and sale of agency-copyrighted software, only
three of the fourteen agencies responding stated that they always com-
ply with requests for such access; one agency stated it never complies.'1°
Additionally, four of the nine agencies responding said they denied ac-
cess to agency-created software because the "[algency determined that
the software was not needed to analyze public records data."",
Given the growing trend toward object-oriented programming and
data bases, granting government agencies authority to copyright soft-
ware becomes increasingly troublesome. With object-oriented software,
"information . . . becomes encapsulated in software objects," and it is
difficult, at best, to separate software from data. 5 2 Specifically, "a
software object contains both program instructions and information,"
and because object-oriented software makes the two even more insepa-
rable, "[t]he limited distinctions that now exist will disappear quickly as
most software becomes available as objects."'5
According to a report recently issued by the congressional Office of
Technology Assessment, "[s]oftware is necessary for users to access
and manipulate digital information stored inside a computer or on stor-
age media. It is difficult, with some modern programming techniques,
146. See Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) ("Where a public record is
maintained in such a manner that it can only be interpreted by the use of a code then the code
book must be furnished to the applicant."), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1983).
147. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 86.
148. Joseph L. Ebersole, In Perspective: Copyright of Government Software Will Not Im-
prove Tech Transfer, FED. COMPUTER WK., DEc. 2, 1991, AT 15.
149. FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3) (1991). See also HB 2225 Staff Analysis, supra note 3, at 1.
150. See Appendix, infra, at 478.
151. See Appendix, infra, at 478 (emphasis added). Interestingly, nearly one-fourth (22%) of
the agencies responding said they denied access to software because it was against agency policy
to "provide copies without payment of the full market price" for the software-a clear violation
of § 119.083(3).
152. Joseph L. Ebersole, Copyright Protection for Government Software Isn't Needed, FED.
COMPUTER WK., May 18, 1992, at 38, 39. See also Edith Herman, Coalition Hits Fed Software
Copyright Legislation, FED. COMPUTER WK., May 11, 1992, at 1, 69.
153. Ebersole, supra note 148, at 50.
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to distinguish between the computer program and the data the program
manages." 1 4 Thus, giving government agencies a monopoly over soft-
ware through copyright necessarily results in the same control over the
information and data inextricably intertwined with that software-a re-
sult that raises serious First Amendment concerns about access to gov-
ernment information. "Public interest in speech from the government is
as keen as it is in speech about the government." 1 5
C. Software as a Public Record
A related issue involves agency-created software as a public record.
Because a public record, defined as "work created by public employees
and financed by public money," belongs to the public, it consequently
falls in the public domain.1 6 Both federal law and public policy pre-
clude copyright protection for that which is in the public domain. 5 7
Computer software programs developed by a government agency to
serve the needs of the agency are generally considered public domain
software.' However, some still question whether agency-created soft-
ware constitutes a public record under Florida law.
In Florida "public records" are defined as "all documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, or
other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or
received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the trans-
action of official business by any agency."' 59 In construing this defini-
tion, the Florida Supreme Court held in Shevin v. Byron, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc., that "a public record.., is any ma-
terial prepared in connection with official agency business which is in-
tended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some
type." 160 The Attorney General has cited the Shevin definition as sup-
port for the conclusion "that a computer program developed by a pub-
154. Finding A Balance, supra note 74, at 19.
155. Simon, supra note 130, at 450.
156. Id. at 430.
157. The statutory basis for this prohibition is found in 17 U.S.C. § 102 which allows copy-
right protection only for original works of authorship. The concept of public domain is much
broader, however, encompassing not only works created and published before the enactment of
copyright laws, such as Shakespeare's plays, or works on which the copyright has expired, such
as Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn, but also potentially copyrightable works for which protec-
tion is denied due to public policy. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965
(1990).
158. See, e.g., William D. Goran, What's the Appropriate Role of Public-Domain GIS Soft-
ware?, GIS WoRLL, Apr. 1992, at 72.
159. FiA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1991).
160. 379 So. 2d 633, 640 (Fla. 1980).
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lic agency in order to perform certain [agency] functions is a public
record for purposes of ch. 119.216(
A number of statutory arguments bolster this conclusion. First, the
fact that the provision authorizing the copyrighting and marketing of
agency-created software was drafted as an amendment to the Public
Records Law rather than codified as an amendment to the law by Stat-
utory Revision after its enactment could lead to the conclusion that the
Legislature considered such software a public record.
Second, section 119.07(3)(q), Florida Statutes, exempts "sensitive"
agency-created software from the inspection and copying requirements
of chapter 119, Florida's Public Records Law. Because the Legislature
specifically exempted sensitive agency software from the dictates of the
Public Records Law, presumably all agency-created software-sensitive
or not-is public record. The Legislature seemed to recognize this argu-
ment in that the fees for access to agency-copyrighted software "solely
for application to data or information maintained or generated by the
agency" must be determined in accordance with section 119.07(1), the
general fee provision governing most public records. 162
Finally, the Federal Copyright Act of 1976 defines a "computer pro-
gram" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."1 63
Consideration of this definition in conjunction with the Shevin public
record definition lends support to the Attorney General's conclusion
that software created by an agency "in order to perform certain
(agency]functions" is a public record under Florida law.164
D. Copyright and the Federal Government: Proposed Legislation to
Allow Federal Agencies Limited Software Copyright
Although 17 U.S.C. § 105 precludes copyright protection for works
of the federal government, 16 legislation currently before Congress
would allow a federal agency to copyright agency-created software in
specific and very limited circumstances.
The Technology Transfer Improvements Act of 1991, House Bill 191,
would amend the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of
198066 by granting federal agencies the authority to obtain copyright
161. 1986 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 236, 238.
162. FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3) (1991). Unless otherwise prescribed by law, all public records
are subject to the fee provisions dictated by § 119.07(1), Florida Statutes.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
164. 1986 FLA. Arr'V GEN. ANN. REP. 236, 238.
165. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (1988).
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for computer software "prepared in whole or in part" by agency em-
ployees in partnership with the private sector under cooperative re-
search and development agreements (CRDAs). 167 Additionally, the
proposed legislation would give the government-employed author of the
copyrighted software a share of any royalties realized from the sof-
tware's commercial sale or license. 16 According to Representative
Constance A. Morella, 169 sponsor of House Bill 191, the purpose of the
bill is "to enhance technology transfer from [ federal laboratories" by
replicating "provisions of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986, which applies to federal patents created under CRDAs. Since the
passage of that act, the licensing of federal patents has become an im-
portant avenue for the transfer of government inventions to private in-
dustry for commercial use."' 70
House Bill 191 was further narrowed during committee hearings to
"expressly exclude[] data bases from coverage.''7 As amended, the bill
defines computer software as "a computer program as defined in the
copyright law and any instructions to use the program, but not data,
data bases, and data base retrieval programs.' 72 In testifying before
the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Intellectual Prop-
erty, Representative Morella "noted that H.R. 191 is not a major infor-
mation policy-making vehicle," but rather "'is truly just a limited
response to a specific problem. '""71
In contrast, one could consider section 119.083, Florida Statutes, "a
major information policy-making vehicle" in that it sets a precedent by
authorizing state agencies to profit from the commercial sale of what is
arguably public record. 74 And, Florida's copyright provision is cer-
167. H.R. 191, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991). The companion bill in the Senate is substan-
tially similar to the House bill. S. 1581, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
168. See H.R. 191 § 3 (amending § 14 of the Stevenson-Wydler Act).
169. Repub., Maryland.
170. Constance A. Morella, Federal Software Needs Protection, FED. COMPUTER WK., May
11, 1992, at 17 (emphasis added).
171. Markup of Bills H.R. 191 & H.R. 2941: Markup Sessions Before the Subcomm. on
Technology and Competitiveness and the Full House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technol-
ogy, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1991) (statement of Rep. Morella, sponsor of H.R. 191) [hereinaf-
ter Markup Sessions].
172. Id. (emphasis added). See also Morella, supra note 170, at 53 ("[H.R. 191] has been
carefully constructed to apply to the operational aspects of the software rather than the informa-
tional content of databases in which the software operates.").
173. See Herman, supra note 152, at 69 (citing Markup Sessions, supra note 171, at 9).
174. See, e.g., Testimony of Frank Hagy, Director of MIS, City of Orlando, and President
of the Florida Local Government Data Processing Assoc., at Public Hearing on Proposed Rules
for Electronic and Optical Imaging Systems, Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives and Records
Management (June 8, 1992) (minutes of hearing available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.). In his testimony, Mr. Hagy recommended that the Bureau "avoid[]
focusing on the public's right-to-access; this is not the issue. The real issue ... is the ability to
copyright and sell data." Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
COPYRIGHT PRO VISION
tainly not a limited response to a specific problem. 175 Unlike the pro-
posed federal legislation-as noted before the House Committee on
Governmental Operations-section 119.083 does not contain limiting
language on the types of software an agency can copyright. Therefore,
a state agency could conceivably succumb to purely commercial inter-
ests, and copyright and market agency-created software which is not
"necessary to support the agency's mission." 176
Section 119.083 is also easily distinguished by its breadth-all agency-
created software in Florida is copyrightable and marketable. 77 By al-
lowing copyright of only that software developed by a federal agency
under a cooperative research and development agreement with a private
entity, the proposed federal legislation is extremely narrow in scope and
breadth. Representative Morella made it quite clear that all other gov-
ernment-produced software remains free and accessible: "Federal soft-
ware, which is freely available, will continue to remain freely available
to the public under [H.R. 191J.'17 One cannot say the same for soft-
ware created by a Florida agency.
Even though House Bill 191 has garnered bipartisan congressional
support and the endorsement of the Register of Copyrights, it has been
met with increasing opposition from the software industry and public
interest groups. Consequently, the bill's passage is not assured.1 79 Crit-
ics of the proposed legislation, while supporting its goals, fear that al-
lowing federal copyright of software would actually reduce
commercialization while threatening First Amendment rights. 8w In ad-
dition, they warn that House Bill 191 "represents a 'drastic shift' in
copyright policy that could have a 'detrimental impact on the public's
right to know."""' At least one commentator, pointing to 1988 and
1989 amendments to the Stevenson-Wydler Act that offer limited intel-
lectual property protection for public domain software, claims House
Bill 191 is not needed and would actually weaken rather then strengthen
the information industry in the United States.' u
175. Ch. 90-237, 1990 Fla. Laws 1769 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 119.083 (1991)).
176. See Report from Info. Indus. Ass'n, supra note 124, at 5.
177. See FLA. STAT. § 119.083(3) (1991). The only statutory qualification limits the fees an
agency may charge for access to software necessary for application to agency information or
data; copyright for such software is not precluded.
178. Morella, supra note 170, at 53.
179. See Herman, supra note 152, at 1.
180. Ebersole, supra note 148, at 15.
181. Herman, supra note 152, at 69 (quoting letter from coalition of 21 companies, trade
associations, and public interest groups to Representative William Hughes, chair of the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Intellectual Property).
182. See Ebersole, supra note 152, at 38, 39.
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Various federal employees have voiced concern as to the impact of
House Bill 191 as well. They fear that allowing copyright of federal
software as specified in the proposed legislation would cause some fed-
eral researchers to "withhold information that might be commercially
valuable."' 83 Others fear that the resolution, by placing emphasis on
copyrighting and licensing federal software, will cause a shift in priori-
ties from basic research to research with commercial applications.' In
either case, the enactment of House Resolution 191 may well inhibit
rather than enhance the free flow of ideas by causing a negative impact
on technological research and technology transfer.
C. Copyright and State Government: How Other States Legislate the
Copyright Issue
Florida is not the first state to confront the issue of authorizing gov-
ernmental copyrights. According to a subcommittee of the Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association, by
1989 at least twenty-eight states had claimed copyrights on a variety of
very basic state-produced materials."" An increasing number of states
have also moved to protect agency-developed software. At least seven
states, including Kansas, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Wis-
consin, have exempted computer programs from their public records
laws, and others have specifically provided for copyright or copyright-
like control over agency-created software.116
In Alaska, state law authorizes state agencies and municipalities to
copyright software and to protect their copyrights through enforcement
procedures.' Utah has recently passed new legislation which provides:
"A governmental entity that owns an intellectual property right and
that offers the intellectual property right for sale or license may control
by ordinance or policy the duplication and distribution of the material
based on terms the governmental entity considers to be in the public
interest."""8
California exempted agency-developed software from its public re-
cords law in 1988, authorizing state agencies to "sell, lease, or license
183. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED No. 90-145, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
COPYRIGHT LAW CONSTRAINS COMMERCIALIZATION OF SoME FEDERAL SoFTwARE 40 (1990).
184. Id.
185. See Gov't Relations to Copyright, supra note 127, at 224.
186. See infra notes 187-214 and accompanying text.
187. ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.71.060, 44.99.400 (1991).
188. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-201(10)(a) (1992). This legislation was effective July 1, 1992.
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the software for commercial or noncommercial use."' i 9 In an effort to
protect the public's right to access governmental records, however, the
California amendment stipulates that the mere storage of information
in a computer does not affect its status as a public record. Instead,
"[p]ublic records stored in a computer shall be disclosed as required by
this chapter."'19
1. Minnesota
Minnesota has one of the oldest and most well-known laws authoriz-
ing its agencies to copyright software. Minnesota's recently amended
statute provides:
When a request under this subdivision involves any person's receipt
of copies of public government data that has commercial value and is
a substantial and discrete portion of or an entire formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, data base,
or system developed with a significant expenditure of public funds by
the agency, the responsible authority may charge a reasonable fee for
the information in addition to the costs of making, certifying, and
compiling the copies. '9
Under authority of this statutory provision, a private firm, Ultimap
Corporation, entered into a licensing agreement with Hennepin County
in 1987 to market and improve an agency-developed software package,
a demographics program called Ultimap.'" The terms of the agreement
required Ultimap Corporation to pay Hennepin County royalties on sa-
les of the software program. 93 In 1987, the county received $500,000 in
licensing fees and royalty payments, and predicted an additional $2 mil-
lion in royalties over the next five years. 9
Since that time, however, the software program has proven only a
qualified success. After receipt of the initial fees and royalties in 1987,
Hennepin County received royalty payments of only $134,900.'"
189. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254.9(a) (West 1992). Further, during the 1992 legislative session,
Assemblyman Ferguson introduced AB 3219, legislation which would have made it a misde-
meanor for government agencies in California "to use public funds to market software in com-
petition with private companies." NAT'L CotNcn OF STATE LEoISLATURES, 1 STATE INTO. POtLCY
NEWS 6 (July 1992). Although the bill passed the Assembly, it died in the Senate Committee on
Transportation after being amended. Id.
190. Id. § 6245.9(d).
191. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03 (West 1992).
192. See PROBLEMS AND ISSUES, supra note 4, at 89.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Telephone Interview with Gary Kamp, Acting Director of the Hennepin County De-
partment of Information Services (Feb. 10, 1992) (on file with Fla. Jt. Legis. Info. Tech'y Re-
source Comm.).
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Because Ultimap Corporation owned only the right to sell the copy-
righted software and not the copyright itself, the corporation had diffi-
culty securing financing.19 As a result, Hennepin County sold its
copyright to Ultimap Corporation in mid-1991 .19
Gary Kamp, Acting Director of the Hennepin County Department of
Information Services, believes a number of factors contributed to the
program's limited success, including a weak economy, unanticipated
competition, and overly ambitious goals. 98 Nevertheless, Kamp feels
the software program was an overall success, and states that, although
the County has not sold or licensed any other software, it would make
the most of similar opportunities, should they arise.199
2. Wisconsin
Wisconsin has also experienced a full cycle of agency software devel-
opment and copyright. The Wisconsin Legislature created a system of
twelve regional Cooperative Educational Service Agencies (CESAs)
which was designed to assist local school districts in cooperatively pur-
chasing or providing services." ° In 1985, with concern over the financial
stability of available software vendors and the quality of their offerings
mounting, one CESA decided to develop its own administrative soft-
ware program, Integrated Management of Payroll and Accounting (IM-
PACT). 0 1 By charging fees in excess of cost for other services provided
to its member school districts, the CESA accumulated sufficient funds
to undertake development of the software. 2 Once developed, four
CESAs jointly marketed the software program to the school districts
beginning in 1987.203 By the end of 1989, the program was in use in
sixty-one school districts and five CESAs.20
In response to complaints of unfair competition with the private sec-
tor, the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau prepared a report on the
196. Id.
197. Id. The structured $1 million deal included an initial cash payment, monthly payments
over a one-year period, and a percentage of Ultimap Corporation's net income for the years
1993 to 1996, with a minimum payment provision. Additionally, Hennepin County retained




200. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN, AUDIT SUMMARY No. 89-41, AN
EVALUATION OF Coop. EDUC. SERV. AGENCIES PROD. AND MKTG. OF COMPUTER SoFTw~aE 2
(1989).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3, app. II. Estimated cost of the initial program was $312,000. Id.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id.
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IMPACT experience. A summary of some of the report's criticisms and
suggestions for improvement follows:
a. Written Policies
The Audit Bureau expressed concern over the lack of any written pol-
icy on when software should be agency-produced as opposed to pur-
chasing software from the private sector. The Audit Bureau felt that a
lack of documentation would hamper an agency in assessing the capa-
bilities of private vendors or its own staff, and would prevent compari-
sons.2 "Written policies would assist [agency] staff in determining the
most appropriate means of meeting an [agency's] needs, and could also
be used by the Legislature and members of the public as a standard to
which [agency] activities could be held accountable.' '2
b. Pricing Mechanisms
The Audit Bureau emphasized the need for the CESAs to use care
when setting prices so that the CESA would not earn sizeable profits
but would not set prices so low that they would undercut private ven-
dors competing with the CESAs.
"It is evident that the CESAs set the base price of IMPACT at a level
which was consistent with prices for comparable software packages
marketed by private vendors, and actual costs related to production
had little effect on product price."°v
c. Program Maintenance
The cost of maintaining the software program also troubled the Au-
dit Bureau. While the actual numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau
were disputed, the CESA acknowledged that maintenance and support
of the marketed program would be an additional expense.m "Staff
time and costs required to 'de-bug' the program and respond to school
staff questions and requests [had] been considerably greater than antici-
pated."0
The Audit Bureau report concluded by making recommendations "to
adopt policies on competition and to improve the accountability of
[agency] decisions to produce goods and services. ,210
205. Id.
206. Id. at 14.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Letter from Dale Cattanach, Wisconsin State Auditor, to Sen. Brian B. Burke and Rep.
Peter W. Barca, co-chairs of the Wisconsin t. Legis. Audit Comm. (Dec. 6, 1989) (on file with
Fla. Jt. Legis. Info. Tech'y Resource Comm.).
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3. New Mexico
New Mexico has taken a slightly different approach. According to
Terry Boulinger, Director of Marketing for New Mexico Tech-Net, 2"
each agency in the state deals directly with Tech-Net in determining its
software needs. 212 Tech-Net then copyrights any software that is devel-
oped, and licenses it back to the state agency and to all agency-ap-
proved entities at no cost."' Tech-Net allows public access to the
software, but charges a flat fee of $1,000 to anyone who wants the
software's source code. The point of having a low, flat fee, says Bou-
linger, is to encourage dissemination of information and interaction be-
tween the state government and private entities, while enabling Tech-
Net to recover some of its basic development costs. 214
V. CONCLUSIONS
By restricting access to agency-created software through copyright,
section 119.083 runs contrary to government policies and intrudes upon
First Amendment interests. 213 In addition, any legislation authorizing
state agencies to profit from the commercial sale of agency-created soft-
ware-as does section 119.083-sets a dangerous precedent for copy-
righting and marketing other public records with potential commercial
value, a precedent which directly contradicts Florida's rich tradition of
open access to public records.216
Because government agencies in Florida rely "on justifications other
than financial considerations" for producing software, copyright pro-
tection for works created as a result of a government agency's public
211. Tech-Net is a private non-profit organization offering remote electronic access to state
records and other services.
212. Telephone Interview with Terry Boulinger, Director of Marketing for New Mexico
Tech-Net (May 14, 1992) (on file with Fla. Jt. Legis. Info. Tech'y Resource Comm.).
213. Id.
214. Id. Under federal copyright law, any modifications to Tech-Net's copyrighted software
could themselves be copyrighted as a derivative work, but the copyrighted original remains pro-
tected from unauthorized copying. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of derivative work); Id. §
103(b) (copyright in derivative work extends only to the material contributed, "as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed" in the derivative work).
215. Andrea Simon reached a similar conclusion in an article evaluating the problems created
by copyrighting work commissioned and funded by the government. Simon, supra note 130, at
466 (Restricting access to government works is "not only inconsistent with the policies support-
ing the government copyright prohibition, but it also intrudes impermissibly on highly protected
first amendment interests.").
216. See, e.g., Hugh Archer & Peter L. Croswell, Public Access to Geographic Information
Systems: An Emerging Legal Issue, PHOTOGRAMMETPIC ENGINEERING & REMOTE SENSING, Nov.
1989, at 1575; Lori P. Dando, Open Records Laws, GIS, and Copyright Protection: Life After
Feist, 4 URISA PROC. 1 (1991); Dale Friedley & Larry Colbert, Reaching for Consensus in Pub-
lic Information Access Policies, 4 URISA PRoC. 50 (1991).
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function is unnecessary and, therefore, inappropriate. 21 7 The objective
of copyright protection is "to promote knowledge, . . . 'not . .. to
maximize returns to authors and inventors.""'21 Thus, if the work a
Florida agency is seeking to protect through copyright would have been
produced "apart from any opportunity to exploit it commercially-be-
cause, for example, performance of a governmental function required
the information-then copyright seems unnecessary,"2 '9 and the Legis-
lature should repeal section 119.083.
Failing this, the Florida Legislature should amend the statute to curb
its broad grant of authority. As currently written, section 119.083 al-
lows Florida agencies to copyright and market any agency-created soft-
ware. To avoid the potential for abuse and the possible diversion of
public funds into commercial software ventures, the Legislature should
limit agencies to developing only software that is necessary to support
their public mission. 220 Furthermore, if agency-created software is to be
protected by copyright, there must be a clear statement of policy in
accordance with federal copyright law and the concomitant public pol-
icy, and it must be proven that "the incentives supposed to result from
protection lead to increased production sufficient to outweigh [the]
disadvantages of protection.' '221
Keeping in mind the criticism leveled at the Wisconsin legislation, the
Florida Legislature should consider the approach taken by New Mexico
together with the results in Minnesota as a model for amending section
119.083. The Legislature should, at the very least, develop a statewide
policy consistent with federal copyright law and traditional public pol-
icy. After all, "[tihe challenges of new technologies is not a gauntlet to
be thrown at proven principles, but a call to the exploration of innova-
tive approaches to new issues, directed at preserving traditional and
cherished values.'""
217. Richard M. Mosk, Copyright in Government Publications, BEVERLY HILLs B.J., Mar.-
Apr. 1971. at 24, 29; see also Kidwell, supra note 129, at 1023.
218. Ginsburg, supra note 136, at 1909 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright
Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 592 (1985)). See also Jack
B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Low Ade-
quate?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 993, 996 (1987) (ultimate objective of copyright law is "dissemination
of works to the public").
219. Kidwell, supra note 129, at 1023.
220. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
221. Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JUR-
IMETRICS J. 33, 46 (1987) (public policy underlying copyright strives "to draw an efficient bal-
ance between incentive for production of works and the dissemination of information for the
promotion of culture and learning").
222. OTA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 51 (statement of Jon A.
Baumgarten, quoting the Declaration of Mission and Principles of the American Copyright
Council).
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE
USE AND SALE OF AGENCY-COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE
The Florida Legislature's Joint Committee on Information Technology Re-
sources is conducting this survey to collect information on your agency's ex-
periences with and opinions about a 1990 Florida law, s. 119.083, F.S.,
which allows government agencies and other public bodies to copyright and
sell or license software which they create. Please complete this questionnaire
and return the completed form in the enclosed envelope. If you need assis-
tance or have any questions about this survey, please call Committee staff at
(904) 488-4646 or SUNCOM 278-4646.
For our follow-up purposes, please provide the name and phone number of
the questionnaire respondent: question specific
This questionnaire has six sections. Please follow the directions for each.
I. SOFTWARE USE
This section of the questionnaire concerns the computer software used by
the agency. "Software" includes both applications and operating systems
programs. Please circle the appropriate answer for each question.
1. Does this agency use any computer software other than commercial
software it purchases?
Out of 401 Yes (65%) 262 No (35%) 139
2. Has this agency ever produced its own software?
Out of 401 Yes (62%) 249 No (38%) 151 No answer(< 1%) 1
3. Has this agency ever contracted with someone else to develop software
for the agency's use, where the agency kept the copyright to the pro-
gram?
Out of 401 Yes (2176) 85 No (78%) 314 No answer(< 1%) 1
4. Has this agency ever developed software which was intended only for
sale and not for use by the agency?
Out of 401 Yes (0%) P No (100%) 401
[If you answered YES to any of the questions #1 through #4 above, please
continue to the next page.]
[If you answered NO to questions #1 through #4 above, please go to Sec-
tion VI on the back of the questionnaire.]
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II. SOFTWARE PROTECTION
This section of the questionnaire concerns copyright for any software that
has been developed by or for the agency. Please mark all the answers that
apply.
5. Has this agency tried to copyright any software developed by or for the
agency?
Out of 270 Yes (13%) 36 No (860o) 233 No answer(< 1%)!
If yes, what steps has this agency taken to provide copyright protection
for its software? (Please mark all that apply.) Out of 36
(6 ) 24 Copyright symbol placed on all copies
(47%o) 17 Copyright registered with the federal Copyright Office
(53o) 19 Relied on the automatic provisions of the copyright law
2 Other (Please describe)
6. How many software copyrights does this agency hold with the federal
Copyright Office? Answer combined with #7
7. If the agency has filed copyrights with the federal Copyright Office, on
what date was the first software copyright filed?
381 respondents held no copyrights as of 1992
3 respondents did not answer this question



































478 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:441
II. SOFTWARE AS PUBLIC RECORD
This section of the questionnaire concerns this agency's response to
requests for its copyrighted software. Please mark the answers that apply.
8. By law, those who wish to use agency-copyrighted software solely on
data of the agency are entitled to receive the software at the agency's
cost to copy it. How often does this agency receive these requests for
copies of its own copyrighted software at the cost-to-copy price?
Out of 36
(67Vo) 24 Never
(31o) 11 Less than one request per month
( 0%) 0 One to five requests per month
( 30o) 1 More than five requests per month
9. How often are these requests met by the agency? Out of 14
( 8%) 1 Never
(3 3 %) 4 Sometimes
(33%) 4 Often
(25%) 3 Always
10. What are the most common reasons that unfilled requests are not met?
(Please mark all that apply.) Out of 9
(44%) 4 Agency determined that the software was not needed to
analyze public records data
(56%) 5 Requestor did not intend to use the software for applica-
tion solely to agency data
(22%) 2 Agency policy is to not provide copies without payment
of the full market price for copyrighted software
(44%) 4 Other (Please describe)
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IV. AGENCY LITIGATION
This section of the questionnaire concerns legal actions taken by the
agency or brought against the agency. Please mark all the answers that
apply.
11. How does this agency protect against infringement of its software copy-
rights? (Please mark all that apply.) Out of 36
(17 ) 6 Review similar software in the market for infringement
( 6%) 2 Warning letters are sent to infringers
( 007) 0 Have a fund to pay for pursuing potential lawsuits
(75%o)27 No regular, consistent plan for software protection
established
(14) _5 Other (Please describe.)
12. Has this agency ever filed suit or threatened to file suit to prevent in-
fringement of its software copyrights?
Out of 36 Yes (001o) 2 No (100Oo) 36
If yes, describe the result of such filed or threatened suits.
13. Does this agency take steps to ensure software it develops will not in-
fringe on the software copyrights of others?
Out of 270 Yes (230o) 61 No (49%) 133 No answer (28%) 76
If yes, what steps does the agency take? (Please mark all that apply.)
Out of 61
(69%) 42 Review similar software in the market before develop-
ment
(110%) 7 Isolate software developers
(25) 15 Other (Please describe)
14. Has this agency ever had a suit threatened or filed against it to prevent
it from infringing another's software copyrights?
Out of 270 Yes (1%) 2 No (800o) 215 No answer (200%o) 53
If yes, describe the result of such filed or threatened suits.
19921
480 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 20:441
V. SOFTWARE SALES
This section of the questionnaire concerns the sale or license of software
copyrighted by the agency. Please mark all the answers that apply.
15. Has the agency ever offered for sale or license any software for which
the agency held the copyright?
Out of 270 Yes (7%) 20 No (9201o) 248 No answer (1) 2
16. Has the agency ever sold or licensed, for more than the cost of duplica-
tion, any software to which it held the copyright?
Out of 270 Yes (40) 12 No (95%) 257 No answer(< 1%)!
17. Has the agency ever assigned to anyone some or all of its rights to a
software program in exchange for compensation or other rights?
Out of 270 Yes (4016) 11 No (96%) 258 No answer( < 1/0) 1
If yes, please describe the transaction.
[If you answered YES to any of the questions #15 through #17 above,
please continue.]
[If you answered NO to questions #15 through #17 above, please go to
Section VI on the back of the questionnaire.]
18. How many different software programs have been sold or licensed by
the agency?
19. When did the agency first sell or license a software program?
20. Estimate the agency's total gross revenues from software sales or
licenses.
380 respondents had not sold any software
2 respondents did not answer this section
Those 19 who did gave this information:
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# of programs sold year of first sale
3 1975 did not answer
1 1977 $ 40,000
1 1981 0*
3 1983 $ 10,000
2 1983 $ 7,500
12 1984 did not answer
2 1985 $ 8,250
5 1986 $ 60,000
5 1987 $600,000
3 1989 0*
2 1990 $ 500
1 1990 *
6 1990 0*
1 1990 $ 26,536
1 1990 $ 30,000
5 1991 did not answer
1 1991 $ 1,000
1 1991 0*
2 1992 $ 3,250
* lack of revenue indicates other considerations
21. Which of the following entities have purchased or licensed software
from the agency? (Please mark all that apply.) Out of 23
(901) 2 Private individuals
(26%) 6 Private companies
(26°)6- City government agencies
(26%) 6 County government agencies
(13%o) 3 State government agencies
(30%7) 7 Other (Please describe)
22. What factors are included in establishing a price for the software the
agency sells or licenses? (Please mark all that apply.) Out of 23
(48%) 11 Personnel time (22%) 5 Costs of production
materials




(35%) 9 Market considerations
(48 ) 11 Cost of duplication
(260) 6 Other (Please describe)
total revenue
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23. How has the agency marketed its software programs? (Please mark all
that apply.) Out of 23
(30%) 7 Presentations or displays
(09%) 2 Engaged in competitive bid process
(04%) 1 Hired staff to market and promote software
(30%) 7 Contracted with outside entity for marketing and soft-
ware promotion
(04%) 1 Purchased advertising
(13%) 3 Direct mail
(17%o) 4 Articles or notices in trade letters
(48%) 11 Other (Please describe)
24. How does this agency support the software it sells or licenses? (Please
mark all that apply.) Out of 23
(17%) 4 Customization of (61%) 14 Technical support by
programs telephone
(22%) ~ Software installation (26%) 6 by mail
Training provided (13%) 3 in person/buyer's
office
(26%) 6 at the agency's office (13%) 3 in person/agency
office
(35%) 8 at the buyer's office (35%) 8 Debugging
(39%) 9 Program upgrades (22%) 5 Other (Please
developed describe)
25. Please estimate, by percentage, the distribution of revenues from soft-
ware sales or licenses into the following categories.
(%)
Data processing and information resources - - - -
(i.e., computer hardware and software)
Forwarded to agency fiscal office - - - -
Unspent to date
Other -_-_-_-
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VI. COMMENTS
This section of the questionnaire seeks comments on the effects of s.
119.083, F.S., on survey respondents, and additional issues and concerns
of the agencies receiving this questionnaire. Attach additional sheets if
necessary.
26. Has this agency ever purchased software from another public agency?
Out of 401 Yes (12%) 48 No (84%) 338 No answer(4o) 15
If yes, please describe the other agency and the program, price, service,
and other aspects of the experience.
27. Has this agency ever traded its software for that of another public
agency?
Out of 401 Yes (50o) 21 No (91%) 363 No answer(4%) 17
If yes, please describe the other agency, the programs, the nature of the
transaction, and other aspects of the experience.
28. What impact has the passage of s. 119.083, F.S., (allowing government
agencies to copyright software) had on the agency? Out of 401
Big Impact 23 ( 6%)
No Impact 317 (79%)
No answer 47 (12%)
Little Impact 5 (10%o)
Unknown 6 ( 1%)
Other 3 ( 1%)
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29. If this agency has not taken advantage of s. 119.083, F.S. in the past,
would it consider doing so in the future? Why or why not? Out of 401
yes: (3N 141 unknown: 1 75
no: (26N 103 no answer: ( 82
Reasons to:
build revenue/save money 34 (8%)
recover cost 22 (5%)
allows price setting 3 (1%)
enhance information sharing 8 (2%)
protect software rights 13 (3%)
clearly define ownership 1 (< 1010)
Reasons not to:
prefer commercial software 4 ( 1%)
programs too specialized 13 ( 3%)
too costly to maintain 5 ( 1%)
agency too small 33 ( 8%)
no need to copyright 22 ( 5%)
moral/ethical issues 12 ( 3%)
avoid conflict of interest 2 (<1%)
Other, generic answers: 42 (10%)
No answer: 187 (47%)
30. Does this agency have a policy on software procurement, e.g., when to
produce software itself and when to acquire it elsewhere?
Out of 401 Yes (13%) 53 No (80%) 322 No answer (6%) 26
If yes, please enclose a copy of the written policy or describe it.
31. Please feel free to provide any additional comments that would help the
Committee understand the issues surrounding s. 119.083, F.S.
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